The social representation of Europe as a common project driving unification of East and West proved the most powerful tool used in the post-Helsinki Europe to bridge the divisions of the Cold War and subvert the Communist takeover of Eastern Europe. It was endowed with historical legitimacy despite historical evidence in its favor being rather ambiguous, and was used by both Western and Eastern Europe to advance their policies in a combination of self-interest and identity discourse. It was not identical in the West and the East, however, and this article explores these differences.
2 one point, that the driving force behind transformation of postcommunist Europe must be liberal ideology, because it was the only one left standing. The implicit assumption was that ideology, despite recent evidence of its widespread failure as a persuasive agent even when enforced with the strongest hand ever --that of totalitarian Communism-is behind political and social change. On quite a different line, I argue in this paper that an important idea guiding the anticommunist resistance and then the subsequent transition to capitalism and democracy was the concept of a common European identity, which should lead in the end to the reunification of the continent into one political construction. The original idea came from Western Europe and did not include Eastern Europe at all. It was however imported in Eastern Europe and refashioned as an anticommunist device beginning with the seventies. Centered on identity, rather than ideology, the idea evolved in the hands of very talented East European intellectuals such as Milan Kundera to reach the proportions of a social representation, one widely held by citizens of the region, inspiring and legitimating their anticommunist resistance. Their allies in the West recuperated it in its new shape and used it as a device to prompt liberalization of East European political regimes. The advantage of an identity discourse over an ideological one is formidable. Ideology is a perceived as a choice, while identity is perceived as a given. Pleading to a' return to Europe' was no longer, after a common identity was proclaimed, an ideological gesture, but an act of restoring the nature. Those opposed to an Eastern Europe similar to, and united with Western Europe, were therefore opposing nature and history, going against the organic order of things with their dogmatic and blind ideology. In this dispute the opponents of the idea were singled out as 'the ideologues', as proponents of Europe considered them to be above ideology. 
An Europe divided by Communism
Eastern Europe has traditionally been divided into spheres of influence, a mere reflection of the Western European competition among powers, with rivalry outmatching cooperation, and differences prevailing over commonalities. The unification of Western Europe starting with the treaty of Rome and the common fate imposed by Communists on the whole of Eastern Europe led to the idea of two halves of Europe, overstating the internal cohesion of the two parts. The fathers of the unification had little initial thought for the eastern part of the continent, trying to solve the heritage of the Second World War in their own half. There is no reference to Eastern Europe in the speeches of Jean Monnet, for instance. However, Robert Schuman noted in passing in 1963: "We must build the united Europe not only in the interest of the free nations, but also in order to be able to admit the peoples of Eastern Europe into this community if, freed from the constraints under which they live, they want to join and seek our moral support. We owe them the example of a unified, fraternal Europe. Every step we take along this road will mean a new opportunity for them. They need our help with the transformation they have 4 to achieve. It is our duty to be prepared." Konrad Adenauer also stated "we should also look eastwards when we think of Europe. They must be given the opportunity to accede". It seemed for a while that the Soviets could tame the idea for their own purpose. The process that Havel describes in this speech explains the power of the 'return to Europe' discourse. Kundera and the adepts of this idea geographically grounded the abstract Communism/Liberal ideological dichotomy in the geography of the continent.
In Mikhail Gorbachev famous
To be free meant to be European, to be Communist was Asian, therefore non-European.
After the passing of Communism, it was rather difficult to revert from this simplified form to the more complex reality. And indeed the Central European identity eroded fast after it lost its main opponent, the Soviet Union, as shown in the mixed record of the so- Central Europeans had found in Vishegrad a powerful tool to advance European enlargement as a regional cause, which made it a more powerful cause than a purely national one would have been. But it was competition rather than cooperation which dominated most of the first decade of transition, once Europe decided for the country-bycountry approach. In a way, it was Europe which killed the myth of Central Europe. In the same time, Western leaders started to replace the terminology, gradually substituting 'Europe' for 'the European Union'. Only few Eastern leaders followed this direction, and the in the East 'Europe' kept is broader meaning. In the West, it has been effaced from the media soon after the liberation of the Eastern part of the continent, to be replaced by the highly technical language of enlargement. The documents adopted by the Essen The Iraqi crisis generated a real split in the opinion of elites in the two Europes. It also brought to the surface a conflict which has managed to remain hidden for most of the In the last decade the transition countries bordering united Europe seemed to enjoy an advantage over more distant countries, resulted from the proximity of a development model: will this go on? Is the power of Europe to emulate transformation by imitation exhausted? Indeed Europe, or at least some of its member states, seems more wary than glad of this power. It has set in motion something of a crusade, only this time the infidels are more enthusiastic than the crusaders. One powerful argument invoked against further enlargement is that promises given too early, such as to Turkey, will return to haunt EU as pressures to accept a country before it is really European-like.
The other argument against further 'rolling' enlargement is that Europe will lose in cohesion what it gained in territory; that the 'digestion' of the newcomers will prove long and painful, hindering closer integration of the hard European core 21 . If Europe were just a common market, it would run no danger over these matters. As it has ambitioned more than that, it is perhaps the time to separate myth from reality. Social representations are hard to dismantle. The social representation of Europe as a common project driving unification of East and West proved the most powerful tool used in the post-Helsinki
Europe to bridge the divisions of the Cold War and subvert the Communist takeover of Eastern Europe. It was endowed with historical legitimacy despite historical evidence in its favor being rather ambiguous, and was used by both Western and Eastern Europe to advance their policies in a combination of self-interest and identity discourse. It was not identical in the West and the East, however. The general Eastern vision is for Europe to continue enlargement to the East, something EU is not prepared to do. Of course these different visions can be bridged: Europe is about compromise. But how far can core members pursue a common vision which is less and less their own, in a context which has changed considerably from the times the whole project was designed, without losing all interest in it? Publics in Ireland, France and Netherlands seem already to perceive that they were left behind. The idea of reuniting Europe proved remarkably strong, but the resulting Europe is likely to be quite different from the original design of the founding
